In this paper, we study manufacturers mergers and their impact on product variety.
Introduction
A common business strategy among manufacturers of branded consumer goods is product proliferation, that is, the o¤ering of di¤erent variations of the same product by a single …rm. Kellogg's, for instance, o¤ers more than 20 di¤erent varieties of cereals, Ben & Jerry's sells 39 varieties of ice-cream, and Colgate and Crest each delivers more than 35 types of toothpaste. Product proliferation is not restricted to supermarket goods. It takes place in several product categories, such as sunglasses, apparel, watches, and consumer electronics. 1 Besides investing in the extension of their product lines, …nal product manufacturers often decide to merge among them. This occurs in various industry sectors. For instance, in the automobile industry, German carmaker Volkswagen is on track to …nalize the full takeover of sports car manufacturer Porsche. They said in a recent statement that Porsche will become another fully integrated brand of the Volkswagen group as of August 1, 2014.
Moreover, mobile phone manufacturers merge with each other (Sony/Ericsson), and so do producers of personal care goods (Colgate-Palmolive/Sanex), software programs (Oracle/PeopleSoft), electronics (Panasonic-Sanyo) and so on. 2 One of the recent concerns of the U.S. antitrust authorities regarding mergers between manufacturers is their potential impact on product variety. That is, whether and how a manufacturers merger will alter the merged …rms' decisions regarding their product lines, and in turn, will a¤ect product variety in the market. In fact, this concern has been formally expressed in the most recent U.S. Merger Guidelines (2010) which mention explicitly that in the evaluation of horizontal mergers, the authorities should focus not only on the impact of mergers on cost-related ef…ciencies, but also on their potential impact on product variety. Moreover, in practise, the U.S. antitrust authorities have taken into account the merger's impact on product variety in the evaluation of a number of recent merger cases. For example, in 2003, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenged the merger of Nestlé Holdings, Inc. and Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., in the super-premium ice cream market, citing that "the market for superpremium ice cream is already highly concentrated, and this deal will reduce the number of signi…cant competitors from three to two" and it would "lead to anticompetitive 1 In most of these product categories, …rms'product lines di¤er, not in quality, but in other features such as scent, color, or design, i.e., their products are horizontally di¤erentiated. 2 For additional examples see Froeb et al. (2007) or visit http://www.manufacturing.net/topics/mergersand-acquisitions. e¤ects . . . including less product variety and higher prices". 3 In this paper, we study the relationship between manufacturers mergers and product variety. A key novelty of our approach is that we consider a setting where manufacturers operate in a vertically related industry, i.e., in an industry where production and distribution of the goods take place at di¤erent industry levels. In such a setting, a manufacturers merger can a¤ect not only the number of goods produced but also the terms of vertical trade which, in turn, determine the e¢ ciency of downstream …rms and the …nal prices paid by consumers. Our purpose is to address a number of fundamental questions of both theoretical and practical importance, such as: How product innovation a¤ects and it is a¤ected by the intensity of market competition? What is the relationship between product variety and wholesale prices? Whether and how a merger among manufacturers alters their product innovation decisions? Is a manufacturers merger pro…table and welfare improving?
In our model, two upstream manufacturers produce initially two horizontally di¤erenti-ated goods that they distribute to consumers through two competing multiproduct retailers.
Manufacturers decide, …rst, whether or not they will merge, and second, whether they will invest in product innovation. More speci…cally, they decide whether they will introduce additional in the market after incurring the respective …xed costs. The resulting total number of products in the market can be two, three or four. Next, manufacturer(s) set the wholesale prices of their goods and, in turn, the downstream retailers choose their quantities. As a benchmark, we consider also, what happens when …rms operate in a one-tier market, i.e., when product manufactures sell directly their products to consumers. The consideration of this benchmark case allows us to highlight the role of vertical relations and the potential importance of accounting for them and for vertical trading in the analysis of the merger implications on product variety.
The introduction of a new product in the market gives rise to two opposite e¤ects regardless of whether manufacturers have merged or not. First, it results into an increase in the market size. We refer to this e¤ect, which encourages product innovation, as the market expansion e¤ect. Second, product innovation causes the appearance of intrabrand competition: a new product that a manufacturer introduces steals away -"cannibalizes" -demand from its already existing products. Clearly, this intrabrand competition e¤ect discourages product innovation. Furthermore, product innovation has an additional e¤ect in the non-merger case only, an interbrand competition e¤ect: the new product competes against the product(s) of the rival manufacturer. The latter e¤ect intensi…es when product innovation takes place.
In light of the above mentioned e¤ects, we show that in the absence of a merger upstream, as the total number of products in the market increases, the wholesale prices decrease. However, when the merger materializes, the number of products has no e¤ect on the wholesale prices. Intuitively, in the non-merger case, the introduction of additional products in the market implies that interbrand competition among manufacturers gets stronger, and thus, the incentives of each manufacturer to behave more aggressively by lowering the wholesale prices of its product(s) get reinforced. In the merger case instead, the interbrand competition e¤ect is fully internalized by the merged …rms. Importantly, we …nd that the equilibrium wholesale prices when two manufacturers merge are always higher than when they remain independent. This holds even in the cases where we …nd that there is more product variety in the merger case than in the non-merger case. Stated in other words, double marginalization is always more severe when the merger materializes.
We show also that the equilibrium number of products depends crucially on the intensity of product market competition, captured by the degree of product di¤erentiation.[[THIS
IS A GENERAL STATEMENT -BUT THE ANALYSIS THAT FOLLOWS IS
ONLY for THE CASE OF NO MERGER and not for the merger case.]] More speci…cally, when manufactures remain separated and products are very close substitutes, innovation incentives are completely absent. When, instead, products are not so close substitutes, at least one of the manufacturers has incentives to innovate as long as the cost of doing so is not too high. This occurs because when products are very close substitutes, both the intrabrand competition e¤ect and the interbrand competition e¤ect are strong and o¤set the positive market expansion e¤ect. Otherwise and as long as product innovation is not too costly, the market expansion e¤ect can dominate and result into product innovation.
Interestingly, when goods are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated and the cost of product innovation takes intermediate values, manufacturers are trapped into a prisoners'dilemma situation: although they would be better o¤ if they could both commit not to innovate, since product innovation is a unilaterally dominant strategy, in equilibrium they both end up introducing a new variety to the market. [[PERHAPS WE SHOULD USE ALSO SOMEHOW
AS AN ARGUMENT ALSO THE WHOLESALE PRICE EFFECT]]
Importantly, we …nd that a manufacturers merger can a¤ect product variety. In fact, we can have more product variety when manufacturers merge than when they remain separated.
This holds only when products are su¢ ciently close substitutes and product innovation is not too costly. Why is that? As mentioned previously, the market expansion e¤ect and the intrabrand competition e¤ect are present both with and without a merger. Instead, the interbrand competition e¤ect is present only when manufacturers remain separated. When products are close substitutes, the interbrand competition e¤ect is strong and reduces the product innovation incentives of the non-merged manufacturers. The opposite holds when, instead, products are not too close substitutes, for two reasons. The …rst reason is the prisoners' dilemma situation in which the manufacturers are trapped in the non-merger case. The second reason is the fact that the intrabrand competition e¤ect is stronger in the merger case. This is so because by investing in product innovation, an upstream merged …rm increases its products from two to three or to four products, while an upstream separated …rm increases its products only from one to two.
Concerning the mergers welfare implications, we …nd that although a merger always bene…ts the upstream manufacturers, it hurts both the downstream retailers, the consumers and overall welfare. This is because of the higher wholesale prices in the merger case that worsen the double marginalization problem and result into higher …nal prices. Thus, even in the cases where a merger upstream leads to more variety in the market, its overall e¤ect on social welfare is negative. This suggests that a merger's potentially positive impact on product variety, cannot be used as an argument in favor of the merger in its evaluation by the antitrust authorities in cases in which the merger enhances signi…cantly the market power.
Our paper is related to several di¤erent strands of the literature. First of all, it is related to the strand of the literature that studies the relationship between market concentration and product variety. A large proportion of this literature is empirical. In particular, Alexander (1997) and Watson (2009) study respectively the music distribution industry and the eyewear retailing market and …nd a non-monotonic relationship between concentration and product variety. George (2007) , instead, studies the U.S. daily newspapers market and concludes that more concentrated markets tend to have more variety both in terms of the number and of the variety of topics covered. Focusing on the issue of product variety in response to a merger, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) …nd that mergers in the U.S. radio broadcasting market prompted an increase in both variety per station and overall variety in the market. In contrast, according to Gotz and Gugler (2006) and Fan (2003) mergers in the Austrian gasoline market and in the U.S. daily newspapers market caused a decrease in their product variety. Summing up, the empirical literature documents the existence of a relationship between product variety and market structure and suggests that the assumption that a merger leaves product variety una¤ected is questionable. This, in turn, suggests that the analysis of mergers in markets with di¤erentiated products and multi-product …rms that does not take into account the mergers'impact on product variety can be incomplete.
Although the empirical evidence indicates that mergers can a¤ect product variety, the existing theoretical work on the e¤ects of horizontal mergers focuses either on the mergers' price e¤ects (e.g., Reynolds et al., 1983, Davidson and Deneckere, 1985) and/or on their cost related e¢ ciencies (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro, 1988, Perry and Porter, 1985) and ignores, to a large extent, their impact on product variety. 4 A notable exception is the paper of Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) which studies how a merger a¤ects …rms'decisions regarding the expansion of their product lines. More speci…cally, Lommerud and Sorgard consider a market with three …rms and di¤erentiated products. They assume that initially each …rm o¤ers one product and that there is a …xed non-sunk cost of marketing a brand. They …nd that whenever a merger between two out of the three …rms is pro…table, it either has a negative impact or no impact at all on product variety and that it is often detrimental to welfare. When instead the merger triggers the introduction of a new product by the outsider, and thus, causes an increase in product range, the merger is unpro…table. Another exception is a recent paper by Chen and Schwartz (2013) which also studies a merger's implications on product innovation. 5 In contrast to Sorgard (1997), Chen and Schwartz (2013) consider mergers to monopoly and assume that initially only a single product is o¤ered by all the market participants. They …nd that when product innovation is su¢ ciently non-drastic, the incentives to innovate are stronger when the merger takes place, and subsequently, that consumer welfare and overall welfare can then be higher under monopoly than under other more rivalrous regimes. 6 Importantly, all the above mentioned 4 We should note that there exists a vast theoretical literature on the product line decisions of competing …rms (see, e.g., Brander and Eaton, 1984 , Raubitschek, 1987 , Martínez-Giralt and Neven, 1988 , Gilbert and Matutes, 1993 , De Fraja, 1993 , Dobson and Waterson, 1996 , Avenel and Caprice, 2006 , Gandhi et al. 2008 . However, this literature does not examine the impact of market structure changes on these decisions. Moreover, there is an extensive theoretical literature on product variety driven not by product proliferation but by …rms'market entry decisions (see e.g., Salop, 1979 , Schmalensee, 1978 , Lancaster, 1979 , Eaton and Lipsey, 1979 and Innes, 2008 .
5 Greenstain and Ramey (1998) analyze a similar topic in a vertical product di¤erentiation framework. 6 Note that there is a number of papers (see e.g., Gandhi et al., 2008 and Mazzeo et al., 2012 ) which exam-papers consider only one-tier markets. Therefore, in contrast to us, they do not take into account the fact that product manufacturers often operate in two-tier markets and, by not doing so, clearly, they do not explore the role of vertical relations and trading for the merger implications on product variety.
Our paper is also related to the recently growing literature on horizontal mergers in vertically related industries. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) , Ziss (1995) , O'Brien and Sha¤er We complement Milliou and Pavlou (2013) work by using a less restrictive market structure, and importantly, by analyzing the product variety related e¢ ciency gains of upstream mergers. The only papers that, to the best of our knowledge, do consider product variety issues within this literature are the papers by Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) and Faulí-Oller (2008) , which focus on downstream mergers and not on upstream mergers. Both of these papers demonstrate that a merger among retailers allows them to commit not to sell one of the goods supplied by manufacturers, and thus, that such a merger can result into a welfaredetrimental decrease in product variety. These papers di¤er from ours not only because of their di¤erent focus, but also because in their setting there is no product innovation; the number of products manufactured by the upstream manufacturers is exogenous and the downstream …rm(s) choose how many of them they will distribute. 8
Finally, our work is also related to the branch of the literature that endogenizes the distribution systems that arise when there is market power at both the manufacturing and the retailing levels (see, e.g., O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1997 , Bernheim and Whinston, 1998 , Lin, 1990 , O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1993 , Chang, 1992 , Moner-Colonques et al., 2004 and Mauleon et al., 2011 . In our paper, in contrast to this literature, we do not focus on ine how a horizontal merger can a¤ect product variety not though through altering the number of products but through altering the product characteristics. In other words, they examine whether post-merger, the merged …rm has incentives to reposition its products in terms of their degree of product di¤erentiation. 7 Berry and Waldfogel (2001), von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) , Dobson and Waterson, (1997) , Inderst and Wey (2003) , Lommerud et al. (2005) , Fauli-Oller and Bru (2008) , Symeonidis (2008) and (2010), Faulí-Oller (2008) , Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2012) and Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) , study, instead, downstream mergers. 8 In a related paper, Milliou, Petrakis and Sloev (2010) , similarly to us, endogenize upstream product innovation. However, they focus on the role played by the economies of scope and upstream entry and not by the upstream mergers. the choice of distribution system. In fact, we take as given the distribution system, in the sense that we assume that retailers are multiproduct …rms that distribute all the varieties produced upstream, and focus instead on manufacturers mergers and on manufacturers incentives to invest in product innovation. 9 The rest of the paper has the following structure. In Section 2, we describe our model.
In Section 3, we perform the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4, we examine the implications of merger on the wholesale prices and product variety. In Section 5, we explore the merger incentives and the merger's impact on downstream …rms, consumers and welfare. In Section 6, we discuss the role of vertical relations. In Section 7, we enrich our analysis by considering what happens when there are three upstream …rms in the market and the merger does not lead to monopoly. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude.
The Model
We consider a market consisting of two upstream product manufacturers, M 1 and M 2 , and two downstream retailers, R 1 and R 2 . Each M i , with i = 1; 2, produces, initially, a singleproduct at zero marginal cost. 10 Each R k , with k = 1; 2, sells to the …nal consumers the products of both manufacturers after paying the per unit of product wholesale prices, w 1 and w 2 , respectively to M 1 and M 2 .
Manufacturers can invest in product innovation. In particular, each M i can introduce an additional product variety after incurring a …xed cost, F > 0. Moreover, manufacturers can merge among them. The order of their decisions is as follows. In stage one, M 1 and M 2 decide whether or not they will merge. 11 In stage two, if the merger has not taken place, each M i decides whether it will introduce an additional product. Depending on their decisions, we will have two, three or four products in the market. In case of merger, the merged entity, M , decides respectively whether it will continue producing two products or it will invest in product innovation and increase the number of products to three or four. 12 In 9 This is not a restrictive assumption however. Moner-Colonqués et al. (2011) show, in a similar setting, that retailers would choose to overlap their product lines whenever their retail margins are not too asymmetric.
1 0 Note that we would obtain qualitatively similar results if we had assumed instead a positive and constant marginal production cost.
1 1 In Section 7, we extend our analysis to the case in which there are 3 mannufacturers in the upstream market and the merger takes place among just two of them, i.e., it does not create an upstream monopoly.
1 2 We implicitly assume that the …xed cost of producing the initial variety is already sunk for the …rms. In other words, the withdrawal of one of the two initial brands by the merged …rm would not result into any stage three, the manufacturer(s) set the wholesale prices for each of their products. Finally, in stage four, the retailers choose the quantities of all the products.
The retailers face a continuum of identical consumers. Following Singh and Vives (1984) , the representative consumer has a quadratic utility function separable in income given by:
where Q n denotes the total quantity of good n sold in the market, with n 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, N denotes the total number of products in the market, i.e., N 2 f2; 3; 4g depending on the manufacturers'product innovation decisions, and I stands for consumer's income. From the utility maximization program we directly obtain the following (inverse) demand function faced by R k for each product n:
where p nk and q nk are respectively the price and the quantity of product n sold by R k , q nl is the quantity of the same product sold by the rival retailer R l , with k; l = 1; 2 and k 6 = l, and Q n is the quantity of the rest of the product(s). 13 The parameter , with 0 < < 1, denotes the degree of product substitutability; namely, the higher is , the closer substitutes are the products of the manufacturers. 14;15
Our notational convention for the rest of the paper will be as follows. The …rst superscript, M or S, will denote respectively whether the manufacturers have merged or remained separated and the second superscript will denote the total number or products in the market.
…xed cost saving. Given this, it can be shown that the merged …rm has no incentives to withdraw one of its products from the market and become single-product.
[[WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT INCLUDING THIS IN THE MAIN TEXT]
In Section 7, we discuss, however, how this result can change if we consider a setting with three upstream manufacturers. 1 3 Observe that q nk + q nl = Qn with n 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g: 1 4 Note that with this formulation of utility, the two retailers are not di¤erentiated, i.e., consumers do not perceive di¤erently a product sold at one retailer than at the other retailer.
1 5 Note that for the sake of simpli…city denotes the degree of product substitutability both among the products of di¤erent manufacturers and among the products of the same manufacturer.
Equilibrium Product Innovation
In the last stage of the game, independently of whether the manufacturers have merged or not, each R k chooses the quantity of each of the products in order to maximize its pro…ts which are given by:
Solving the system of …rst order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium quantities of each product n sold by R 1 and R 2 , q n1 (w n ; w n ) and q n2 (w n ; w n ) respectively. 16 Clearly, these quantities depend not only on the wholesale prices but also on the total number of products in the market. The respective total market demand for product n is Q n = q n1 (w n ; w n ) + q n2 (w n ; w n ).
Upstream Separated Firms and Product Innovation
When M 1 and M 2 remain separated, in stage three, they choose the wholesale prices of their products. There are three possible third-stage subgames depending on the number of products that they manufacture: (i) the "no product innovation" subgame where both M 1 and M 2 produce one product each, (ii) the "partial product innovation" subgame where M 1 produces two products and M 2 one, and (iii) the "full product innovation" subgame where both M 1 and M 2 produce two products each. 17 Next, we analyze each subgame separately.
When both M 1 and M 2 produce one product each, and thus, N = 2, they face respectively the following maximization problems:
Solving (1), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices:
When, instead, M 1 produces two products and M 2 produces one, their maximization problems are: 18 M ax
The resulting equilibrium wholesale prices are:
It is easy to see that w S3 1 > w S3 2 . That is, the multi-product manufacturer charges higher wholesale prices than its single-product rival.
Finally, when both manufacturers produce two products, they solve the following problems:
M ax w 1 ;w 3 M 1 = w 1 Q 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) + w 3 Q 3 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) and (5) M ax
>From the solution of (5) and (6), we have:
Comparing the di¤erent wholesale prices, we reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 1 When the upstream manufactures are separated, the wholesale prices decrease with the total number of products in the market.
According to Proposition 1, when the upstream manufacturers are separated, the higher the number of products in the market, the lower the wholesale prices. This …nding is mainly driven by the fact that both upstream manufacturers have incentives to behave aggressively and reduce their wholesale prices in order to favour the sales of their own products relative to the respective sales of their rival's products. Their incentives to do so are stronger when competition is more intense and competition is indeed more intense when the number of products in the market increases. In particular, while when manufacturers produce only one product each, there is only interbrand competition, when either one of the manufacturers or 1 8 Note that we implicitly assume in this case that products 1 and 3 are manufactured by M1 and product 2 by M2: both of them produce more products, then not only interbrand is …ercer, but also intrabrand competition is present. In what follows, we will refer to the negative impact of product innovation on the wholesale prices as the wholesale pricing e¤ect.
Next, we analyze each manufacturer's product innovation decision in stage two. There are three candidate second-stage equilibria, each of them corresponding to one of the subgames analyzed above. First, we substitute the equilibrium wholesale prices into the manufacturers'respective (gross from the cost of product innovation) pro…ts in each subgame. We note that the latter can be negative under "full product innovation" unless product innovation is not too costly, and in particular, unless (2 )] 2 . Next, we check for possible deviations from each of the candidate equilibrium and we …nd the following:
Proposition 2 When the upstream manufacturers are separated, F < F S ( ), and (i) > 0:9164, the unique equilibrium is no product innovation (i.e., N = 2),
(ii) 0:8346 < < 0:9164, the unique equilibrium is no product innovation if F > F S 1 ( ) and partial product innovation (i.e. N = 3) if F < F S 1 ( ), (iii) < 0:8346, the unique equilibrium is no product innovation if F > F S 1 ( ), partial product innovation if F S 2 ( ) < F < F S 1 ( ) and full product innovation (i.e., N = 4) when
Proposition 2 informs us that the equilibrium number of products depends not only on how costly is to innovate, but importantly, on the intensity of product market competition.
In particular, when products are very close substitutes, the upstream manufacturers have no incentives to innovate. When, instead, products are not too close substitutes, at least one of the manufacturers will innovate as long as the cost of doing so is not too high. In fact, both of them will innovate when the cost of product innovation is su¢ ciently low and products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated.
Intuitively, product innovation gives rise to four main e¤ects. First, there is the "wholesale pricing" e¤ect that we identi…ed above (Proposition 1) that corresponds to the decrease in double marginalization when the number of products increases. This e¤ect clearly discourages product innovation. Second, there is a market expansion e¤ect which refers to the increase in the market size/demand caused by the introduction of an additional product variety. Clearly, this e¤ect encourages product innovation. Third, there is an intrabrand competition e¤ect. This refers to the fact that when an upstream manufacturer extends its product range, its already existing product faces additional competition. The new product partly cannibalizes the demand for the existing product. Clearly, this e¤ect discourages product innovation. Finally, the fourth e¤ect is an interbrand competition e¤ect. This effect corresponds to the intensi…cation of competition with the rival upstream manufacturer driven by product innovation and also discourages product innovation. When products are su¢ ciently close substitutes, competition is tough and the wholesale pricing e¤ect, the intrabrand competition e¤ect and the interbrand competition e¤ect are very strong and dominate the positive market expansion e¤ect. Otherwise and as long as product innovation is not too costly, the market expansion e¤ect can dominate and result into product innovation.
As mentioned above, when products are not very close substitutes and product innovation is not too costly both upstream …rms innovate. Interestingly though, when both …rms innovate, they can be trapped into a prisoner's dilemma situation, i.e., they would be better o¤ if none of them innovated unless products are not su¢ ciently di¤erentiated and the cost of product innovation is too low. This is so because under partial innovation, the non-innovating upstream …rm has incentives to deviate and innovate as well, so that it expands its own market and steals away market share not only from its own product (cannibalization) but mainly from its rival's products.
Upstream Merger and Product Innovation
Next, we analyze the merger case. After the merger, the newly formed upstream monopolist chooses, in stage three, the wholesale prices for the products that it manufactures. In particular, M solves the following:
M ax
where N = 2 when it does not undertake any product innovation, and thus, manufactures only two products, and N = 3 and N = 4 when respectively it manufactures three and four products. From the …rst order conditions, we …nd:
Two important observations are in place for the equilibrium wholesale prices (9) under upstream monopoly. First, we note that the wholesale prices are independent of the degree of product di¤erentiation. And second, we identify an additional "indi¤erence result", stated formally in Proposition 3 below: the upstream multi-product monopolist's pricing decisions do not depend on the number of its products. This result is similar to the indi¤erence result identi…ed in the literature (see e.g., Petrakis and Dhillon, 2002) regarding the independence of the wholesale prices charged by a single-product upstream monopolist from the number of downstream …rms.
Proposition 3 When the upstream manufactures are merged, the wholesale prices are independent of the number of products in the market.
In order to analyze the merged …rm's product innovation decision in stage two, …rst, we substitute (9) into its respective (gross from the cost of product innovation) pro…ts (8) for N = 2, N = 3 and N = 4 and, second, we subtract the associated …xed cost(s) of product innovation from them. Doing so, we note that we need to assume that
2+4 , in order to make sure that M 's pro…ts are positive in all cases under consideration. Finally, comparing M 's equilibrium pro…ts, M 2 M , M 3 M and M 4 M , we reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 4 When the upstream manufacturers are merged and F < F M ( ), there exist
As Proposition 4 states, the upstream monopolist has incentives to invest in product innovation unless the cost of doing so is too high (F > F M 1 ( )). In fact, when the cost of product innovation is su¢ ciently low (F < F M 2 ( )), it will introduce two, and not just one, products. Intuitively, under upstream monopoly, the market expansion e¤ect that encourages product innovation and the intrabrand competition e¤ect that discourages product innovation are both present. The market expansion e¤ect dominates the intrabrand competition e¤ect as long as product innovation is not too costly. Otherwise, the positive impact of the market expansion e¤ect cannot compensate the upstream monopolist for the cost of product innovation.
Proposition 4 also states that the critical values for product innovation decrease -they become stricter, when product substitutability increases; hence, product innovation is less likely to take place then. This is so because, when products are more similar among them, the intrabrand competition e¤ect is reinforced, i.e., a product tends to cannibalize more the other(s) product(s), and as a result, it has a stronger negative impact on the upstream monopolist's product innovation incentives.
Merger Implications on Wholesale Prices and Product Variety
In this Section, we examine the implications of an upstream merger on the wholesale prices and product variety. Starting with the wholesale prices, our main conclusion is:
Proposition 5 The wholesale prices are higher when upstream …rms merge than when they remain separated.
Note that the above result holds independently of the number of products manufactured in the presence and in the absence of the merger. Hence, it holds even when there is less product innovation in the non-merger case than in the merger case. This is not so surprising: once the upstream manufacturers merge, they stop competing among them. This, in turn, means that they internalize the externality that they would otherwise impose on each other by o¤ering lower wholesale price(s) for their own product(s) so that their downstream sales are enhanced.
Combining Propositions 2 and 4, we are able to evaluate the impact of an upstream merger on product innovation, and hence, on product variety:
Proposition 6 Product variety is:
(i) higher when upstream …rms merge than when they remain separated if > 0:8346 and F is not too high as well as if 0:6931 < < 0:8346 and F takes intermediate values,
(ii) lower when upstream …rms merge than when they remain separated if < 0:7261 and F takes intermediates values, (iii) the same when upstream …rms merge and when they remain separated in all other cases.
A merger among upstream manufacturers can enhance product variety. This holds mainly when products are su¢ ciently close substitutes and product innovation is not too costly. Why is that? As mentioned previously, the market expansion e¤ect and the intrabrand competition e¤ect are present both in the non-merger case and in the merger case.
Instead, the interbrand e¤ect, which weakens the product innovation incentives, is present only in the non-merger case. When products are close substitutes, the interbrand competition e¤ect is strong and leads to less product innovation then. Still, one might wonder why its presence does not always lead to less product innovation in the non-merger case than in the merger case. This could be due to the prisoner's dilemma situation in the former case, which occurs when products are not too di¤erentiated and product innovation is neither too costly nor too cheap, and results into overinvestment in product innovation. Further, it could be due to the fact that for a given level of product di¤erentiation, the intrabrand competition e¤ect is stronger when the merger materializes. This is so because the merged …rm produces from the outset two products and product innovation can increase its products from two to three or to four products. Instead, product innovation by a separate …rm can increase its products only from one to two. Since the intrabrand competition e¤ect is stronger in the merger case, its negative impact on product innovation incentives is, in turn, also more severe then. Finally, notice that the wholesale pricing e¤ect, that is, anticipating higher wholesale prices after a merger, encourages manufacturers to merge and to introduce new varieties after the merger. Moreover, whereas in absence of a merger the wholesale prices decrease with variety, after a merger they are independent of the number of products, which again, provides extra incentives to increase variety in case of a merger compared with the no merger case. We should mention that there are cases in which, while we have no product innovation in the non-merger case, we can have full innovation, and not only partial innovation in the merger case and the reverse. That is, there are cases in which the number of products between the two cases di¤ers by one product and cases in which it di¤ers by two products.
For instance, when > 0:9164, the total number of products without the merger is always 2 while with the merger it is 3 if F takes intermediate values and 4 if F is su¢ ciently low. 19 Moreover, we should clarify that when we say in the statement of Proposition 6 that product innovation is the same with and without the merger "in all other cases", we do not mean that it leads to no product innovation but that it leads to the same level of product innovation as pre-merger.
Merger Incentives and Welfare Implications
In what follows, we analyze, …rst, the upstream …rms' merger incentives, and then the merger's impact on downstream pro…ts, consumer surplus and total welfare.
Proposition 7 An upstream merger always arises in equilibrium.
A merger upstream allows the manufacturers to eliminate interbrand competition, and thus, to eliminate the negative externality that they impose on each other. This allows them to charge higher wholesale prices. Further, it allows them to coordinate their product innovation decisions, and thus, to avoid the prisoner's dilemma situation which results into over-investment. In light of these, it is not surprisingly that, as Proposition 7 formally states, merger incentives are always present or, in other words, an upstream merger always has a positive impact on upstream pro…ts.
What about though the merger's impact on downstream pro…ts? It is important to note that in the merger case as well as in the non-merger case, the pro…ts of downstream …rms increase with product variety. This is quite intuitive. When there are more products in the market, the market size increases, and thus, the sales and pro…ts of the retailers also increase. Actually, in the case of upstream separated …rms, there is an additional reason for which retailers are better o¤ when there is more product variety: an increase in product variety leads to lower wholesale prices and so to increased downstream e¢ ciency. However, we already know that a merger upstream increases the wholesale prices even when it leads to more variety in the market. So, how is this trade o¤ resolved? Notice that an upstream merger leads to higher variety in the market only when the goods are su¢ ciently close substitutes. But for close substitute goods, competition downstream is stronger and this explains that the positive market expansion e¤ect of the introduction of additional goods to the market is smaller. So a merger upstream could potentially bene…t retailers only when competition downstream is soft (that is, when the degree of product substitutability is low).
But in that case, the merger upstream does not lead to more variety in the market. So as a conclusion, an upstream merger hurts retailers'pro…ts regardless of its e¤ect on product innovation: the negative e¤ect of the higher wholesale prices always dominates the positive market expansion e¤ect of the (potential) increased variety, leading to the clear-cut result that the upstream merger hurts the downstream pro…ts.
What about the merger's impact on consumer surplus and social welfare? Concerning consumer surplus, when the goods are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, a merger hurts consumers …rst, because it increases the wholesale prices, which translates into higher …nal prices for consumers and second, because either it reduces or does not change the number of goods in the market. However, when the goods are su¢ ciently good substitutes and for intermediate values of the cost of product innovation, a merger upstream leads to more variety through product innovation by the merged entity, which is bene…cial to consumers. However, even when the merger increases variety in the market, the negative anticompetitive e¤ect of the merger through higher wholesale prices always dominates, implying that consumer surplus is always reduced by the merger.
Finally, concerning the e¤ect of the merger on social welfare, a trade o¤ also arises because the merger is always pro…table for the upstream …rms but it hurts downstream …rms and consumers. As the following proposition shows, the anticompetitive e¤ect of a "merger to monopoly" upstream is so pronounced that it cannot be compensated by the potential merger generated e¢ ciency gains, which in our setting arise via product in- Our result regarding the merger's impact on social welfare, allows us to provide a theoretical justi…cation for the view expressed in the recent U.S. Merger Guidelines (2010) according to which "e¢ ciencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.
Just as adverse competitive e¤ects can arise along multiple dimensions of conduct, such as pricing and new product development, so too can e¢ ciencies operate along multiple dimensions".
The Role of Vertical Relations
In this Section, we explore the role of vertical relations for the merger's implications. In order to do so, …rst, we analyze brie ‡y what happens in the absence of vertical relations, i.e., in an one-tier market where product manufacturers sell directly their products to the consumers, and then, we compare our results with the ones that we have already found in the presence of vertical relations.
In a one-tier market, stage three does not exist, i.e., w 1 and w 2 are zero by assumption, and the quantities are chosen directly by the product manufacturer(s). Performing the equilibrium analysis, we conclude that in such a market, similarly to what happens in a vertically related market, the merged …rm never withdraws one of its already existing products from the market. Importantly, we conclude that a merger in a one-tier market never enhances product variety. This is formally stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 In a one-tier market, a merger decreases product innovation when F takes intermediate values. Otherwise, it does not have any e¤ ect on product innovation.
Independently of whether the merger has no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on product variety, since the merger results into monopoly, it is always pro…table. Moreover, a straightforward implication of the decreased product variety and increased market power under merger, is that the merger in a one-tier market is harmful to consumers and to welfare.
It follows from the above that the consideration of vertical relations is of signi…cant importance. If one does not take them into account, it reaches the conlcusion that a merger always restricts product variety. In contrast, if one allows for such relations, it can conclude that, under certain conditions, a merger can enhance, instead of decrease, product
variety.[[WE NEED TO EXPLAIN THIS MORE....BUT I DID NOT THINK OF AN EXPLANATION YET]]
Still, independently of the merger's impact on product variety, we conclude that a manufacturers merger to monopoly, either in a one-tier market or in a vertically related market, is always welfare-detrimental.
[[IN THE FUTURE, WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT COMPARING THE CRITICAL VALUES OF Fs BETWEEN THE TWO MARKETS IN ORDER PERHAS TO GET ADDITIONAL RESULTS -WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT THIS MORE]] 7 Extension: 3 Upstream Firms
In this Section, we explore whether the manufacturers merger's negative impact on social welfare obtained so far is driven by our simplifying assumption of a duopolistic upstream market that allows us to consider only mergers to monopoly. In order to do so, we extend our main model to the case in which pre-merger there are three, instead of two, upstream manufacturers. As before, manufacturers can invest in product innovation, so each M i , i = 1; 2; 3 can introduce an additional product variety after incurring a …xed cost, F > 0.
This implies that in absence of a merger we can have now 3, 4, 5 or 6 products in the market.
In the case of a merger, we consider only a merger among two out of the three manufacturers.
In this case, the merged entity, M , decides whether it will continue producing the two initial products, it will withdraw one of its two products or it will invest in product innovation and increase the number of its varieties to three or four. That is, after a 2-…rms merger we can have 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 goods in the market.
SOLVED [[WHY INCLUDE THIS FOOTNOTE HERE SINCE YOU MENTION IT LATER ON IN THE MAIN TEXT?]]
Given that the complete resolution of this extended model is cumbersome and for the sake of simplicity in the exposition, we will describe the main results and the di¤erences of this extended model with respect to the main model. 20 Adding a third manufacturer is interesting because it allows to analyze the e¤ect of a manufacturers merger not only on the merged …rms incentives to alter the product range but also on the outsider's incentives to do the same. In contrast with the previous model, in this extended model, a 2-…rms merger does not monopolize the upstream sector and the existence of interbrand competition post-merger reduces the merged …rms' incentives to add new varieties to the market. Indeed, we get that whereas in the 2 manufacturers setting and for close enough substitute goods, a merger could lead the merged entity to increase the number of varieties, in a 3 manufacturers setting, a 2-…rms merger never leads the merging …rms to increase the number of varieties. Indeed, it can be shown that for close enough substitutes ( > 0:91), it could lead them to withdraw one of the two varieties that were already produced before the merger (this never occurs in the main model). The explanation for the latter result is just the existence of interbrand competition post-merger, which reduces upstream …rms'incentives to invest in product innovation, especially when the goods are close substitutes: in this latter case, the reduction of interbrand competition produced by the withdrawal of one of the already existing brands may even compensate the merging …rms for the reduction in sales (notice that this occurs even if there is no …xed cost saving, given that the …xed cost of the initially produced brand is assumed to be already sunk).
On the other hand and not surprisingly, by reducing interbrand competition, the merger leads to an increase in the equilibrium wholesale prices, which hurts downstream …rms (and consumers). This implies that the only way for a merger to be welfare enhancing in this setting would be through a positive e¤ect on variety. We do …nd a region (for very di¤erentiated products ( < 0:39) and intermediate values of the …xed cost F ) where a 2-…rms merger increases total variety (and social welfare). But, interestingly, this increase in variety is not produced by the merged …rm; it is the non-merging …rm who responds aggressively to the merger by adding one more variety. And, as it is intuitive to understand, this merger is not pro…table for the merging …rms so it will not take place (this is another di¤erence with the main model, where the manufacturers merger is always pro…table). Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) …nd a similar result in their setting with a one tier industry and three …rms.
Apart from this particular region, as long as the …xed cost F of introducing a new variety is not too large, the merger always leads to less variety compared with the no merger case. Of course, for su¢ ciently large values of F and regardless of the degree of product di¤erentiation, we …nd a region where there would be no product innovation in both the merger and no merger cases. So we can conclude that in the extended setting with three producers, any pro…table merger must reduce consumer surplus and social welfare (because it increases the wholesale prices (which translate into higher …nal prices) and it does not increase variety in the market).
Summarizing, the comparison between the two models seems to suggest that adding more manufacturers goes in the direction of reducing the merged …rms' incentives to add new varieties after the merger due to increased competition, which makes di¢ cult to …nd welfare improving mergers. On the other hand, talking about merger pro…tability, whereas in the setting with two manufacturers an upstream merger is always pro…table, in the extended setting we can …nd unpro…table mergers, the reason being always an aggressive response by the outsider …rm that reacts to the merger by adding a new brand.
Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the product innovation incentives of competing manufacturers and how they are a¤ected by a merger among them. We have taken into account the fact that most product manufacturers instead of selling their products to consumers directly, they sell them through downstream multi-product retailers. In such a setting, a merger among product manufacturers can change not only the upstream market structure but also the trading with the downstream retailers. Both of these changes can, in turn, a¤ect the incentives of manufacturers to introduce additional products, and thus, they can a¤ect product variety.
We have found that the incentives of manufacturers to introduce new products depends on the degree of product substitutability. In particular, when manufacturers are separated, product innovation takes place only when goods are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated and product innovation is not too costly. Interestingly, as the number of products in the market increases, and thus, market competition intensi…es, the wholesale prices charged by the manufacturers decrease. An upstream merger allows the manufacturers to internalize the negative externality that they impose on each other in the absence of a merger, and as a result, it allows them to charge higher wholesale prices. Moreover, by eliminating the interbrand competition e¤ect, the merger can causes an increase, instead of a decrease, in total product variety relative to the non-merger case. This holds when the cost of product innovation is not too high and the goods are close enough substitutes since then the negative impact of the interbrand competition under no merger is very pronounced. In light of these, it is not surprising that an upstream merger is always welcomed by the upstream …rms and it is never welcomed by the downstream retailers. [[THIS NEED TO BE IMPROVED
IN TERMS OF EXPOSITION]]
Most of the literature on horizontal mergers and their potential e¢ ciency gains has focused so far on cost related e¢ ciencies. However, in practice …rms often invest in order not only to reduce their costs but also to expand their product lines and increase their product variety. Our paper adds value to the existing literature by examining horizontal mergers' potential product variety related e¢ ciencies. We point out that although an upstream merger could give rise to such e¢ ciency gains, i.e., it could result into more product variety, these e¢ ciency gains are not strong enough to overturn its negative impact on consumers and total welfare through the increased wholesale prices. Stated in di¤erent words, we provide a theoretical justi…cation for the view expressed in the recent U.S. Merger Guidelines (2010) according to which "e¢ ciencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.
Just as adverse competitive e¤ects can arise along multiple dimensions of conduct, such as pricing and new product development, so too can e¢ ciencies operate along multiple dimensions." We have shown that this anticompetitive aspect of manufacturers mergers is shown to remain true when we increase the number of producers in the upstream level from two to three, the reason being an increasing level of interbrand competition that reduces the merged …rm incentives to introduce new varieties into the market. Intuitively, this result should hold also for a higher number of producers. I HAVE TRIED...
.[[WE HAVE NOT CHECKED THAT THIS IS THE CASE, WE HAVE CHECKED IT ONLY WITH 3 FIRMS, WITH 4 IT COULD BE DIFFERENT ETC.. SO PERHAPS WE SHOULD WRITE THIS DIFFERENTLY IN THE FUTURE]]
We should stress that our paper constitutes just a …rst step in the direction of understanding the relation between upstream horizontal mergers and product innovation. In a following step, one could examine the role of alternative contract types, such as two-part tari¤s. 21 Moreover, one could also explore how the downstream market structure in ‡uences the manufacturers merger's impact on product variety or it could incorporate economies of scale in the analysis. These extensions are left for future research.
Appendix Third stage equilibrium outputs
The equilibrium quantities obtained after solving the last stage of the game for given wholesale prices are: 2 1 We should note that serious complications arise in situations in which rival upstream …rms trade through non-linear contracts with the same competing downstream …rms. As mentioned in a review article by Miklos-Thal et al. (2010, p.345 ) "The formal modeling of such "interlocking" vertical relations has proved di¢ cult... and we still know relatively little about many basic questions... Interlocking relationships cause modeling issues such as either the inexistence or a large multiplicity of equilibria even in simple competition games." Also, Inderst (2010, p. 343) states that "... the benchmark model where competing upstream …rms simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to competing downstream …rms, may fail to have an equilibrium in pure strategies." (i) when N = 2: q 11 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = q 12 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = a(1 ) w 1 + w 2 3(1 2 ) q 21 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = q 22 (w 1 ; w 2 ) = a(1 ) w 2 + w 1 3(1 2 ) ;
(ii) when N = 3 :
q 11 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) = q 12 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) = a(1 ) (1 + )w 1 + (w 2 + w 3 ) 3(1 ) 6 2 q 21 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) = q 22 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) = a(1 ) (1 + )w 2 + (w 1 + w 3 ) 3(1 ) 6 2 q 31 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) = q 32 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ) = a(1 ) (1 + )w 3 + (w 1 + w 2 ) 3(1 ) 6 2 ;
(iii) when N = 4:
q 11 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = q 12 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = a(1 ) (1 + 2 )w 1 + (w 2 + w 3 + w 4 ) 3(1 2 ) 9 2 q 21 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = q 22 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = a(1 ) (1 + 2 )w 2 + (w 1 + w 3 + w 4 ) 3(1 2 ) 9 2 q 31 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = q 32 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = a(1 ) (1 + 2 )w 3 + (w 1 + w 2 + w 4 ) 3(1 2 ) 9 2 q 41 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = q 42 (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ) = a(1 ) (1 + 2 )w 4 + (w 1 + w 2 + w 3 ) 3(1 2 ) 9 2 :
Proof of Proposition 2
Just by plugging the third stage equilibrium wholesale prices into the manufacturers pro…t functions in the three di¤erent sub-games we get:
A necessary condition for "partial product innovation" (three goods) to be an equilibrium
3(1+2 )(2+(2 ) ) 2 . A necessary condition for "full product innovation" (four goods) to be an equilibrium is
When is "no innovation" an equilibrium? The only possible deviation by, let's say, M1
is to "partial product innovation". Now, if F > F S ( ), then such incentives do not exists.
: This is satis…ed as long as F F S 1 ( ),
it is direct to see that F S 1 ( ) < 0 when g > 0:9164: So if g > 0:9164; no deviation is pro…table and "no innovation" is an equilibrium. If g 0:9164; however, "no innovation"
is an equilibrium only if F > F S 1 ( ): When is "partial product innovation an equilibrium? First of all, we know that it is not an equilibrium when F > F S ( ): Also when F F S ( ) and g > 0:9164; or when g 0:9164
and F > F S 1 ( ):When g 0:9164 and F F S 1 ( );the possible deviation is for M2 to produce two goods instead of 1 good. This deviation is pro…table for M2 as long as S4
But it is direct to see that F S 2 ( ) < 0 when g > 0:8346: So if 0:8346 < g 0:9164; this deviation is not pro…table and "partial product innovation" is an equilibrium. Finally, if g 0:8346
and F > F S 2 ( ); "partial product innovation" is also an equilibrium. When is "full innovation" an equilibrium? It is not an equilibrium when
When F F S ( ); the only possible deviation is for M2 to produce 1 good instead of 2 goods. We know that this deviation is pro…table for M2 as long as g > 0:8346, or when g 0:8346 and F > F S 2 ( ):So we conclude that "full innovation" is an equilibrium only when g 0:8346 and F F S 2 ( ):
Proof of Proposition 3
We have to compare social welfare under the three possible scenarios, namely, 4, 3, or 2 goods in the market.
We need …rst to compute the equilibrium quantities for each scenario by plugging the equilibrium wholesale prices (equations 2 and 4) into the third stage equilibrium outputs (above in the Appendix). Doing so we get:
By using these equilibrium outputs we can compare social welfare associated to each scenario:
(i) Welfare comparison between "full product innovation and "no product innovation":
(ii) Welfare comparison between "partial product innovation and "no product innova-
. This ex-
(iii) Welfare comparison between "full product innovation and "partial product innova-
: This expression equals zero if
We check that F S W 43 ( ) < F S W 42 ( ) < F S W 32 ( ) which implies that if F > F S W 32 ( ); the …rst best would be to have 2 goods in the market (no product innovation); if F S W 43 ( ) < F F S W 32 ( );the …rst best would be to have 3 goods in the market (partial product innovation); …nally, if F F S W 43 ( ); the …rst best would be to have 4 goods in the market (full product innovation). Now, by comparing the …rst best with the market equilibrium number of varieties we obtained in Proposition 2, we can see that the following holds:
Finally, by taking into account the fact that F S 1 ( ) < 0 when g > 0:9164 and that F S 2 ( ) < 0 when g > 0:8346;Proposition 3 results.
Proof of Proposition 5
3+9 : A necessary condition for "partial product innovation" (three goods) to be an equilibrium
2+4
. A necessary condition for "full product innovation" (four goods) to be an equilibrium is
When is "no innovation" an equilibrium? It is always equilibrium when F > F M ( ):
( ) the only possible deviation by the merged …rm is to full innovation (four goods). If instead F F M ( ); there could be deviations to both "partial product innovation (three goods) and "full product innovation" (four goods). If F F M ( );
M deviates to three goods as long as
On the other hand, M deviates to four goods
In short, "no innovation" is an equilibrium if and only if F > F M 1 ( ). When is "partial product innovation" an equilibrium? First of all, we know that it is not an equilibrium when F > F M ( ): When F F M ( ), the possible deviation is for M to produce two goods or four goods instead of three goods. We know that a deviation to two goods is pro…table for M as long as F > F M 1 ( ). On the other hand, M deviates to four goods only if M 4
So summarizing, "partial product innovation is an equilibrium if and only if F M 2 ( ) < F F M 1 ( ): When is "full innovation" an equilibrium? It is not an equilibrium when
the only possible deviation is for M to produce 2 goods instead of 4 goods, whereas if F F M ( ); the possible deviations are for M to produce two or three goods respectively. So, summarizing, "full innovation" is an equilibrium if and
Proof of Proposition 7
Combining the results of Propositions 2 and 5 we can easily rank the di¤erent threshold values of F in order to be able to compare the equilibrium number of varieties pre-merger and post-merger for di¤erent values of the product di¤erentiation parameter :
It is direct to see that when > 0:9164 we have
1 ( ), which implies that (i) for F < F M 2 ( ); the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (4 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only two varieties); (ii) for
) the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (3 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 2 varieties); …nally, (iii) for F F M 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case).
When 0:8415 < < 0:9164 we have F S 2 ( ) < 0 < F S 1 ( ) < F M 2 ( ) < F M 1 ( ), which implies that (i) for F < F S 1 ( ), the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (4 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 3 varieties); F S 1 ( ) F < F M 2 ( ), the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (4 varieties) compared with the premerger case (only 2 varieties); (iii) for F M 2 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ) the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (3 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 2 varieties); …nally, (iv) for F F M 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case).
When 0:8346 < < 0:8415 we have F S 2 ( ) < 0 < F M 2 ( ) < F S 1 ( ) < F M 1 ( ), which implies that (i) for F < F M 2 ( ), the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (4 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 3 varieties); (ii) for F M 2 ( ) F < F S 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (3 goods in each case); (iii) for F S 1 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ) the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (3 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 2 varieties); …nally, (iv) for F F M 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case).
When 0:7261 < < 0:8346
2 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (4 goods in each case); (ii) for F S 2 ( ) F < F M 2 ( ), the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (4 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 3 varieties); (iii) for F M 2 ( ) F < F S 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (3 goods in each case); (iv) for F S 1 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ) the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (3 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 2 varieties); …nally, (v) for F F M 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case). When 0:6931 < F < 0:7261 we have 0 < F S 2 ( ) < F M 2 ( ) < F M 1 ( ) < F S 1 ( ), which implies that (i) for F < F S 2 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (4 goods in each case); (ii) for F S 2 ( ) F < F M 2 ( ), the merger upstream leads to more product innovation (4 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (only 3 varieties); (iii) for F M 2 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (3 goods in each case); (iv) for F M 1 ( ) F < F S 1 ( ) the merger upstream leads to less product innovation (2 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (3 varieties); …nally, (v) for F F S 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case).
When 0:4046 < F < 0:6931 we have 0 < F M 2 ( ) < F S 2 ( ) < F M 1 ( ) < F S 1 ( ), which implies that (i) for F < F M 2 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (4 goods in each case); (ii) for F M 2 ( ) F < F S 2 ( ), the merger upstream leads to less product innovation (3 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (4 varieties); (iii) for F S 2 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (3 goods in each case); (iv) for F M 1 ( ) F < F S 1 ( ) the merger upstream leads to less product innovation (2 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (3 varieties); …nally, (v) for F F S 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case).
2 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (4 goods in each case); (ii) for F M 2 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ), the merger upstream leads to less product innovation (3 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (4 varieties); (iii) for F M 1 ( ) F < F S 2 ( ), the merger upstream leads to less product innovation (2 varieties) compared with the premerger case (4 varieties); (iv) for F S 2 ( ) F < F S 1 ( ), the merger upstream leads to less product innovation (2 varieties) compared with the pre-merger case (3 varieties); …nally, (v) for F F S 1 ( ) the merger does not a¤ect the number of varieties (2 goods in each case).
Proof of Proposition 8
In order to prove Proposition 8 we proceed by comparing the post-merger upstream pro…ts with the sum of the pre-merger upstream …rms' pro…ts for each possible combination of (equilibrium) number of varieties pre and post-merger that arise for di¤erent values of the product di¤erentiation parameter :
Let us write here the equilibrium upstream pro…ts expressions after a merger upstream takes place for the three possible subgames:
3+9 : On the other hand, the equilibrium separated upstream …rms'pro…ts are given by:
So let start with the case < 0:4046: In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4) and (4, 4). 22 Let' s compare the upstream pro…ts for all these cases. Let's start by equilibrium (2,2), which occurs if F F S 1 ( ): We have to compute:
3(1+ )(2 ) 2 > 0, so the merger is pro…table in this region. Equilibrium (2,3) occurs if F S 2 ( ) F < F S 1 ( ): We have to compute in this case:
: It is direct to check that F 23 ( ) < F S 2 ( ) regardless of , which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
We have to compute in this case:
: It is direct to check that F 24 ( ) < F M 1 ( ) regardless of , which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
: It is direct to check that F 34 ( ) < F M 2 ( ) regardless of , which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
Equilibrium (4,4) occurs if F < F M 2 ( ): We have to compute in this case:
3+9 > 0; which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
Let's go on with the case 0:4046 < < 0:6931: In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3), (3, 4) and (4, 4). Let's compare the upstream pro…ts for all the cases not analyzed previously (for equilibria (2,2), (3,4) and (4,4) the proof is already done above).
Equilibrium (2,3): it su¢ ces to check that F 23 ( ) < F M 2 ( ), which holds regardless of , so the merger is pro…table in this region.
6(1+2 )( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2 > 0, which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
Let's go on with the case 0:6931 < < 0:7261: In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3), (4, 3) and (4, 4). Let' s compare the upstream pro…ts for all the cases not analyzed previously (for equilibria (2,2), (2,3), (3,3) and (4,4) the proof is already done above).
: It is direct to check that F 43 ( ) > F M 2 ( ) regardless of , which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
Let's go on with the case 0:7261 < < 0:8346: In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (3, 2), (3, 3), (4, 3) and (4, 4). Let' s compare the upstream pro…ts for all the cases not analyzed previously (for equilibria (2,2), (3,3), (4,3) and (4,4) the proof is already done above).
6(1+ )(1+2 )(2 ) 2 : It is direct to check that F 32 ( ) > F S 1 ( ) regardless of , which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
Let's go on with the case 0:8346 < < 0:8425: In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (3, 2), (3, 3) and (4, 3). All the cases have been previously analyzed above.
Let's go on with the case 0:8425 < < 0:9164: In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (3, 2), (4, 2) and (4, 3). Let's compare the upstream pro…ts for all the cases not analyzed previously (for equilibria (2,2), (3,2) and (4,3) the proof is already done above).
:It is direct to check that F 42 ( ) > F M 2 ( ) regardless of , which implies that the merger is pro…table in this region.
Equilibrium (4,3): it su¢ ces to check that F 43 ( ) > F S 1 ( ), which holds if > 0:3965 (and this is satis…ed as we are analyzing the range 0:8425 < < 0:9164) so the merger is pro…table in this region.
Let's go on …nally with the case > 0:9164:In this case, we can have equilibria (2, 2), (3, 2) and (4, 2). All of them have been already analyzed above, so the merger is pro…table in this last region also.
Proof of Proposition 9
The equilibrium downstream pro…ts under separated upstream …rms for each possible subgame (2, 3 or 4 goods) are given by:
The equilibrium downstream pro…ts under merged upstream …rms for each possible subgame (2, 3 or 4 goods) are given by:
Now we have to compare the downstream pro…ts in the merger and no merger cases for all the possible combinations of varieties that arise in equilibrium, that is: (2,2), (3,3), (4,4), (3, 2), (4,2), (4,3), (2,3), (2, 4), (3,4). The comparisons are straightforward for all the cases where after the merger we have equal or less variety, that is, for the cases (2,2), (3,3), (4,4), (2,3), (2, 4), (3, 4) . For the rest of the cases we have: 
Proof of Proposition 10
Social welfare: Given that we assume that there are no positive marginal production costs, it is direct to see that we can de…ne the (gross of any product innovation costs) social welfare function simply as:
W (Q 1 ; :::; Q N ) = u(Q 1 ; :::; Q N ):
We have to compare social welfare under a merged upstream …rm and under separated upstream …rms for all possible combinations of varieties in equilibrium. We need …rst to compute the equilibrium quantities for each possible scenario by plugging the equilibrium wholesale prices (equations 2, 4 and 7) into the third stage equilibrium outputs. Doing so we get:
: By using these equilibrium outputs we can compare the net social welfare associated to each scenario:
We start in the region < 0:4046: In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (2,3), (6+(3 2 ) ) ) ; 0) + F = = 9F (1+ )(1+2 )( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2 +a 2 ( 10+ ( 26+ ( 29+4 ( 7+ ( 1+4 ))))) 9(1+ )(1+2 )( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2 < 0 if < 0, which implies that in this case the merger reduces social welfare.
Let's move to the region 0:4046 < < 0:6931:In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (2,3), (3,3), (3,4), (4,4). We have already done (2,2), (2,3) and (4,4). 18(1+2 )( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2 < 0, which implies that in this case the merger reduces social welfare.
Equilibrium (3,4): we are in equilibrium (3,4) if F M 2 ( ) F < F S 2 ( ):It is direct to check that F W 34 ( ) > F S 2 ( ), which implies that in this case the merger reduces social welfare.
Let's move to the region 0:6931 < < 0:7261:In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (2,3), (3,3), (4,3), (4,4). We have already done (2,2), (2,3) and (3,3) and (4,4). (6+(3 2 ) ) ) ; 0) = = 9F (1+2 )(1+3 )( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2 +a 2 (10+ ( 6+ ( 101+ ( 114+ (11+38 ))))) 9(1+ )(5+6 )( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2 < 0 if F > F W 43 ( ) = a 2 (10+ ( 6+ ( 101+ ( 114+ (11+38 ))))) 9(1+ (5+6 ))( 2+ ( 2+ )) 2
: But we are in equilibrium (4,3) if F S 2 ( ) F < F M 2 ( ): It is direct to check that F W 43 ( ) < F S 2 ( ) if > 0:1464; which holds in this region so this implies that in the region under consideration the merger reduces social welfare.
Let's move to the region 0:7261 < < 0:8346:In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (3,2), (3,3), (4,3) and (4,4). We have already done (2,2), (3,3), (4,3) and (4,4). 18(1+2 )(1+ )(2 ) 2 : But we are in equilibrium (3,2) if F S 1 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ): It is direct to check that F W 32 ( ) < F S 1 ( ) if > 0:1954; which holds in this region so this implies that in this case the merger reduces social welfare.
Let's move to the region 0:8346 < < 0:8415:In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (3,2), (3,3) and (4,3). We have already done (2,2), (3,2), (3,3). Let's move to the region 0:8415 < < 0:9164:In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (3,2), (4,2) and (4,3). We have already done (2,2) and (4,3). Equilibrium (3,2): it is anticompetitive if F > F W 32 ( ) = a 2 (20+ ( 56+3 (1+5 ))) 18(1+2 )(1+ )(2 ) 2 :But we are in equilibrium (3,2) if F M 2 ( ) F < F M 1 ( ): It is direct to check that F W 32 ( ) < F M 2 ( ) if > 0:2922; which holds in this region, so in the region under consideration F > F W 32 ( ) and so the merger is anticompetitive. 9(1+3 )(1+ )(2 ) 2 :But we are in equilibrium (4,2) if F S 1 ( ) F < F M 2 ( ): It is direct to check that F W 42 ( ) < F S 1 ( ) if > 0:2061; which holds in this region so in the region under consideration F > F W 42 ( ) and so the merger is anticompetitive.
Let's move to the region > 0:9164: In this region we can have equilibria (2,2), (3,2), (4,2). We have already done (2,2) and (3,2).
Equilibrium (4,2): it is anticompetitive if F > F W 42 ( ) = a 2 (10+ ( 24+ (3+5 ))) 9(1+3 )(1+ )(2 ) 2 : We check that F W 42 ( ) < 0 if > 0:4645, which implies that in the region under consideration F > F W 42 ( ) and so the merger is anticompetitive.
Consumer surplus:
We will compare consumer surplus under both merged and separated upstream …rms only for the cases where a merger increases variety (from 3 to 4, from 2 to 4 or from 2 to 3) because they are the only possible cases where consumer surplus could increase after a merger upstream. 
